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Chapter pages in book: (345 - 348)played signiﬁcant role in attempts to stabilize the ﬁnancial system as well
as to prevent deﬂation from becoming a serious deﬂationary spiral. Pro-
viding ample liquidity is one way that would work both to stabilize the ﬁ-
nancial system and to stop deﬂation. This was implemented by increasing
target amounts of the current account balance (held by ﬁnancial institu-
tions) at Bank of Japan in 2003 to 2004. The target amount of current ac-
count balance had become an instrument of monetary policy when the in-
terest rate became zero in the spring of 2001.
The Nikkei 225 stock prices hit the bottom at 7,607 yen on April 28 and
started a recovery. What made that turnaround may be interesting to dis-
cuss (in the future work). Whether new monetary policy contributed to this
more than the Takenaka plan can be debatable.
The paper highlights the importance of the Takenaka plan, but further
investigations in the future would produce a comprehensive assessment of
the role of Minister Takenaka’s role at the bottom of the ﬁnancial crisis in
Japan.
References
Hoshi, Takeo, and Takatoshi Ito. 2004. Financial regulation in Japan: A sixth year
review of the Financial Services Agency. Journal of Financial Stability 1 (2): 
229–43.
Ito, Takatoshi, and Frederic S. Mishkin. 2006. Two decades of Japanese monetary
policy and the deﬂation problem. In Monetary policy with very low inﬂation in the
paciﬁc rim,ed. T. Ito and A. Rose, 131–93. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Peek, Joe, and Eric S. Rosengren. 2001. Determinants of the Japan premium: Ac-
tions speak louder than words. Journal of International Economics 53:283–305.
Comment Randall Morck
This chapter is a useful addition to our knowledge of bank regulation. Its
importance transcends Japan because it is really about how monetary and
ﬁscal authorities should go about providing lender-of-last-resort services.
But its importance also transcends macroeconomics because it is ulti-
mately about how strategic thinking needs to guide economic institutions.
The framework the authors use to develop these issues is Japan’s pro-
longed ﬁnancial malaise around the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Suc-
cessive capital investment, stock market, and real estate bubbles left the
country’s banks severely weakened. These bubbles played out roughly along
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reau of Economic Research.the formula Kindleberger (1976) describes—genuine growth opportunities
attract capital, but the attraction persists even after the opportunities are
exhausted. Overinvestment and asset price inﬂation ensue until the disso-
nance with fundamentals becomes too obvious to ignore, at which point the
house of cards collapses and liquidity evaporates. The economy is left with-
out adequate credit for sound investments and a recession persists.
This synopsis, of course, grossly oversimpliﬁes Japan’s economic
malaise, as it does the scores of other ﬁnancial crises Kindleberger reviews.
But this, like all the others, follows the basic pattern closely enough that
same fundamental paradox is the rub.
As Kindleberger explains (1978, 9) “A lender of last resort should exist,
but his presence should be doubted.” If the economy develops a severe ﬁ-
nancial crisis, the central bank should step forth to bail out the collapsing
ﬁnancial system. But the owners, managers, and creditors of ﬁnancial
ﬁrms must not expect such bailouts, lest they grow lax and permit ﬁnancial
crises to develop. Kindleberger proceeds to write a book about how sus-
taining this essential time inconsistency is imperative to macroeconomic
stability.
One path that sometimes leads through this logical morass is “secrecy”:
sustain the dead ﬁnancial institutions on ﬁnancial respirators, but let the
public believe the bank is hale and healthy. Financial history shows this re-
markably successful on occasion. For example, virtually all the major
Canadian banks were technically bankrupt at the height of the Great De-
pression, but the government buried the evidence. Even as depositors
queued for blocks to withdraw their savings from collapsing American
banks, the major Canadian banks stood in quiet serenity. Half a century
later, the records were opened and these facts laid out (Kryzanowski and
Roberts 1998, 1999). The conventional wisdom that nationwide branch
systems geographically diversiﬁed the Canadian banks, and thus stabilized
them, was overturned. Financial forbearance to zombie banks, not geo-
graphy, stabilized the Canadian banking system.
This sort of forbearance was precisely the strategy the Japanese author-
ities tried ﬁrst. For about ten years, from the bursting of the bubble econ-
omy in the late 1980s to 1997, the government studiously avoided the is-
sue—waiving regulations and injecting funds into clinically dead banks.
But this meant the banks had to play along by feigning health and not rec-
ognizing their past errors. As the authors point out, this was not good for
the economy because “The regulatory forbearance in helping undercapi-
talized banks allowed banks to roll over loans to nearly insolvent ﬁrms....
The subsidized lending led to credit misallocation from manufacturing
ﬁrms with high productivity to nonmanufacturing ﬁrms with low produc-
tivity.” Perhaps something similar happened in Canada in the 1930s—cer-
tainly the Great Depression there was no less calamitous than in the
United States.
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out innocent bystanders, while leaving banks’ decision makers to the con-
sequences of their decisions. This is the next path the Japanese government
tried. In 2002, the government “requested” that banks disclose their non-
performing loans more honestly and ended its regulatory forbearance, but
simultaneously established a system of deposit insurance to bail out house-
holds if their banks failed. This Takenaka Plan conﬁrmed the existence of
a lender of last resort—for banks’ depositors, but not for their managers,
shareholders, customers, or other creditors. There would be no U.S. Great
Depression-style bank runs because the Japanese government would guar-
antee households’ bank accounts.
But this worked little better—in part because of the unusually thick ties
between Japan’s banks and their client ﬁrms. Japanese banks, unlike banks
in most countries, hold corporate shares as capital. As word spread of the
mismanagement of major Japanese businesses, and of their banks’ abetting
that mismanagement, stock prices tumbled, reducing the banks’ capital re-
serves and rekindling fears of a crisis. The government responded with fur-
ther liquidity injections into the banking system plus a nontraditional
monetary policy—the government purchased banks’ shareholdings. This
was another bailout, for the government almost certainly paid the banks
higher prices than their shareholdings would have fetched had they all
been dumped onto the open market.
Finally, the Japanese government adopted a third path—it let a misgov-
erned bank die quickly and painlessly. This ﬁnal switch in policy is the fo-
cus of this chapter’s empirical analysis. I would not have done some of the
analysis in quite the same way. In particular, I worry that merging annual
report numbers with daily stock returns to construct very large ﬁrm-day
panels might bias some of the t-ratios in some of the tables. Nonetheless,
the ﬁndings are useful.
On the news that the government both let a bank fail and oﬀered no
bailouts to its shareholders, it is reasonable that other banks’ share prices
adjusted up or down depending on each bank’s ﬁnancial health or frailty.
In other words, watching an ill-run bank die clariﬁes the importance of a
healthy balance sheet in the minds of other banks’ shareholders.
The chapter deliberately closes with modest conclusions. This is appro-
priate because the ﬁndings are a preliminary ﬁrst pass and are presented as
such. But they clearly delineate directions for future work.
First, the chapter illustrates the utility of the event study methodology in
clarifying directions of causation. These changes in policy—the govern-
ment’s actions in bailing out a bank’s depositors but not its shareholders,
and so on—clearly and unambiguously “caused” other banks’ share prices
to change. This is a much cleaner methodology for ascertaining the ﬂow of
causation than identiﬁcation via instrumental variables in multistage re-
gressions and might proﬁtably be more widely used by macroeconomists.
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thorities’ responses to their country’s prolonged ﬁnancial malaise. In par-
ticular, the problems Kindleberger (1978) highlights arising from an overly
fervent belief in a lender of last resort are beautifully sketched out. Econ-
omists seeking to understand the panic of 2008 will learn much from the
discussion of the political economy beneath these responses and how the
expectations induced by each policy aﬀected the next.
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